By Douglas Ford
A new look at how Britain’s defence institution realized to interact Japan’s defense force because the Pacific conflict progressed. Douglas Ford reveals that, ahead of Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the British held a contemptuous view of jap army prowess. He indicates that the situation was once no longer helped via the excessive point of secrecy which surrounded Japan’s battle making plans, in addition to the absence of past engagements with the Imperial eastern military and military. the autumn of ‘Fortress Singapore’ in February 1942 dispelled the thought that the japanese have been incapable of hard the West. British army officers stated how their forces within the a long way East have been insufficient, and made a concerted attempt to enhance their energy and potency. notwithstanding, simply because Britain’s forces have been tied down of their operations in Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean, that they had to struggle the japanese with restricted assets. Drawing upon the teachings received via Allied reviews within the Pacific theatres in addition to their very own encounters in Southeast Asia, the British used the to be had intelligence at the method, strategies and morale of Japan’s military to make the easiest use of what that they had, and by means of the final levels of the warfare in 1944 to 1945, they have been capable of devise a struggle plan which cleared the path for the profitable struggle attempt. This publication should be of serious curiosity to all scholars of the Second global conflict, intelligence reviews, British army heritage and strategic reports quite often.
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A new look at how Britain’s defence institution discovered to have interaction Japan’s militia because the Pacific struggle progressed. Douglas Ford reveals that, ahead of Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the British held a contemptuous view of jap army prowess. He indicates that the situation used to be now not helped by way of the excessive point of secrecy which surrounded Japan’s battle making plans, in addition to the absence of past engagements with the Imperial jap army and military.
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Additional resources for Britain Secret War Against Japan (Studies in Intelligence)
The prospects of an advance through the Malay peninsula towards Singapore was considered impossible, because the Japanese armies were doomed to face problems in advancing beyond their beachheads. 125 British commanders in the Far East demonstrated a similar level of laxness, and an inability to grasp the need to prepare their forces. In order to hold out against enemy advances in the jungle, infantry units had to conduct a mobile defence, since the poor communications did not permit the use of tanks in large numbers.
88 Such statements suggest that racial contempt was widespread. At the same time, racism was one of a myriad of influences, and its role cannot be properly understood without examining the obstacles which prevented a more informed verdict. Assessments of the IJN were based on racial stereotyping because the lack of reliable information precluded a knowledgeable judgment. In regard to the IJA and the air services, the available intelligence appeared to confirm the British disdain for Japan’s armed forces.
US strategy, on the other hand, aimed to stay on the defensive in the 15 A M B IG U ITY A N D C O M P L A C E N C Y Pacific, and thereafter regroup for attacks on Japan’s main forces in Asia. The Americans regarded Southeast Asia as a British responsibility, and devoted minimal efforts towards intelligence activities there. 12 Cooperation at the level of analysis also appeared minimal. The JIC and service departments rarely referred to conclusions reached by their US counterparts. 13 The rigid demarcation of Anglo-American zones of interest continued to affect collaboration even after the outbreak of war highlighted the need for integration.